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Instantmessenger (IM) is one of themost popular Internet applications all over the world.This paper examines the pricing problem
of IM based on two-sided market model. IM serves as a two-sided platform, which gets both Internet users and advertisers on
board.This paper concludes that IM operator adopts a heavily skewed price structure that favors IM users both under monopolistic
case and under horizontal differentiated duopolistic case. When advertising revenue is large enough relatively to marginal cost for
serving IM users, IM users can enjoy free service provided by IM operators. The competitive equilibrium of duopolistic case is not
necessarily symmetric when advertisers choose singlehoming. Even in the symmetric equilibrium platform would rather deter all
advertisers.
1. Introduction
Instant messenger (IM) is one of the most popular Internet
applications all over the world. Especially in China, the
leading IM Tencent QQ has more than 700 million active
accounts while the latecomer Webchat has attracted 300
million users in just two years, though they belong to the
same company, Tencent [1]. On the other side of Pacific
Ocean, MSN messenger boasted around 330 million active
monthly users in history [2], which is renamed as Windows
Live Messenger and shifts users to Skype in 2013. Skype is
not just only an instant messaging client but also provides
voice-over-IP service which enables users to make Internet
calls to mobiles and landlines. Inheriting user legacy of MSN
messenger, Skype still holds 250 million monthly users in
the context that Internet user’s attention is greatly diverted
to social network sites [3].
The reason for the popularity of IM is that people
need to pay telecommunication carrier for their voice and
SMS service, but they can enjoy free unlimited text and
video communication offered by IM after fixed data plan
payment to Internet service provider. IM operator’s “Over
the Top” (OTT) service poses a drastic innovation threat
to traditional telecommunication carrier. However, a natural
question emerges: how can IM providers sustain their busi-
ness with free service for consumers? Some may argue that
MSNmessenger’s provider Microsoft can cross-subsidize IM
business by other profitable business such as Windows and
Office. This argument cannot hold for independent provider
such as Tencent and Skype before acquisition by Microsoft.
The most common practice for IM operator to retrieve
revenue is to embed display ads on IM client software’s user
interface and sell ads slot to advertiser. If the IM can attract
large amount of users and persuade them to stay enough
time on the chatting box, IM users may see the ads and
presumably click on the ads. Then IM operator can charge
advertisers on the basis of cost per click (CPC). Thus, IM
actually functions as a two-sided platform that connects IM
users and advertisers.
The literature on two-sided markets is burgeoning in
recent years. Two-sided markets are an intermediary agency,
which enables two distinctive groups of agents to interact
on this intermediary. Rochet and Tirole [4] analyzed the
pricing decision of two-sided markets under different gov-
ernance and different market structures, respectively. They
found platform’s pricing structure depends on the demand
elasticity of two sides. Armstrong [5] considered the factors
that influence platform pricing strategy in the presence of
internetwork externality. He argued that the equilibrium
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price is determined by the magnitude of the cross-group
externalities, whether fees are levied on a lump sum or per-
transaction basis and whether agents join one platform or
several platforms. Consolidating the model of Rochet and
Tirole [4] and Armstrong [5], Rochet and Tirole [6] devel-
oped a unified framework for the two-sided market theory.
By “corner” solution, Bolt and Tieman [7] proved that the
side of the market which is sufficiently more elastic than the
other side is kept to aminimumusage fee while the other side
pays a relatively high usage fee. Hagiu [8] considered the case
that producer provides diversified products to consumers
through two-sided platform. In this case consumer prefers
product variety while producers compete for consumers.
He found that when consumer has strong preference for
variety, the optimal price structure for the platform would
extractmore rents fromconsumer rather than producer.Weyl
[9] took user heterogeneity in consideration. He found the
platform could use insulating tariffs to avoid multi-equilibria
and realize platform desired allocation structure. By relaxing
product differentiation on both sides of platform, Armstrong
and Wright [10] generalized the model of Armstrong [5]
and proved “competitive bottleneck” may arise endogenously
rather than exogenously as assumed by previous literature.
The impact of exclusive dealing on equilibrium was also
explored in their model.
The literature on advertising-supported media which is
categorized by Evans [11] complements two-sided platform
theory, although this line of literature developed earlier than
two-sidedmarkets.This line of literature shares some features
with two-sided markets in that media can be regarded as
two-sided platform. Nevertheless, the two-way positive inter-
group network effects do not generally hold in the case of
mass media. The crossnetwork externality that advertisers
bring to audience is still in controversy although it is usually
assumed negative. Anderson and Gabszewicz [12] surveyed
this line of literature and argued that the fundamental tradeoff
of media is balancing the positive externality which audience
bring to advertisers and the possible negative externality
which ads impose on audience. Anderson and Coate [13]
modeled this tradeoff and compared the market provision
equilibrium and social optima. Peitz and Valletti [14] adopted
the same advertising demand function and compared the
equilibrium of pay-TV and free-to-air model. Gal-Or and
Dukes [15] employed Nash bargaining to model the trans-
actional relation between two advertisers and two broad-
casting stations. The highly concentrated product market in
their model grants two producers who also advertise some
monopsony power. Gabszewicz et al. [16] explicitly modeled
the advertiser’s choice on single-homing or multihoming.
Multihoming enables advertiser to reach more audience but
demands dual payments to both stations. Advertisers are
vertical differentiated by the marginal profit derived from
unit of audience. Advertisers who lie at the upper end of the
market choosemultihomingwhile those at the lower end only
choose single-homing. Reisinger [17] endogenized overall
usage time for watching TV and assumed usage time depends
on the advertising level. He proved that platforms obtain
positive margins in the advertising markets although there is
Bertrand competition for advertisers. Besides that, platform’s
profit increases in viewers nuisance cost of advertising.
Although theory of two-sidedmarket is applied to various
industries including mass media, IM rarely deserves the
subject of literature. Faulhaber [18] pursued a case study of the
merger between AOL and Time Warner and focused on the
market power resulting from the merger in IMmarket. From
the perspective of network externality he proved in a market
with increasing demand that the market share of dominant
firm increased at the expense of competitor’s market share.
Nevertheless, the intergroup network externality between
IM users and advertisers was ignored in his study. Kim
et al. [19] focused on the tying practice and showed that
Microsoft can leverage its monopoly power in the operating
systemmarket to the instantmessengermarket through tying
strategy. However, they did not touch the pricing problem.
Much of the study on two-sided markets takes banking
card industry as research subject [4, 6, 20], while the litera-
ture on advertising-supported media often takes traditional
media such as TV broadcasting, newspaper, and magazine as
example. To the best of our knowledge, the pricing problemof
IM still lacks formal analysis. This is our writing motivation.
In practice, IM is generally free of charge to consumers
but sometimes IM charges some prices for specific service.
For example, Skype charge consumers low rates for calls
to mobiles and landlines (VoIP call). We try to find under
which conditions IM is totally free and which circumstance
consumers need to pay some money in our model.
The differences between our model and aforementioned
two lines of literature are listed as follows.
Most of the literature on two-sidedmarkets takes the total
transaction volume between two sides as the output of the
platform. We just add another dimension by incorporating
user’s online time duration into the two-sidedmarkets model
and redefine the output of IM platform that better illustrates
the characteristic of behavioral patter of IM user.
Most of the literature on advertising-supported media
neither ignores media’s subscription charges to audience nor
analyzes it in a discrete way. Our model consolidates their
study in a continuous framework. Besides that the literature
for TV broadcasting modeled users’ switching behavior
between different TV stations [16]. TV audience usually does
not care about how much other audience watching the same
station.However, IMusers usually use only one IMand prefer
the IM that is most popular among their friends. We assume
single-homing and intragroup externality among IM users
to better illustrate IM characteristics that are significantly
different from TV audience.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present
the monopolistic platform case. In Section 3 we present the
duopolistic platform case. Section 4 contains conclusions and
possible further extension.
2. Monopolistic Platform
The demand function by IM user is denoted as 𝑛(𝑝𝐴, 𝑎). 𝑝𝐴
is the one-shot registry fee charged by the platform, 𝑎 is the
number of affiliated advertisers. Each advertiser is assumed to
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put unit of ads on IM platform, so the number of advertiser
represents the amount of ads on the platform. 𝑛 is the number
of IM users who register on the IM platform. We assume
𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝑝𝐴 < 0 and 𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝑎 < 0. That means higher registry fee
andmore advertisers frustratemore potential users to affiliate
and vice versa.
Among those homogenous registered users, a representa-
tive user’s online time duration is denoted as 𝑡 = 𝑡(𝑛, 𝑝𝑡). 𝑝𝑡
is the duration rate charged by the IM platform on the basis
of how long IM users keep online while 𝑛 is the number of
affiliated users. We assume that 𝜕𝑡/𝜕𝑛 > 0 and 𝜕𝑡/𝜕𝑝𝑡 < 0.
These assumptions suggest that when the number of IM user
is larger, the probability of user who signed in IM at any
given time meeting with other online users is larger and the
expected online time duration is longer. Higher time rate also
forces IM to users spend less time online.
Advertiser’s advertising demand function is 𝑎 = 𝑎(𝑛𝑡, 𝑟)
where 𝑛𝑡 is the total online time duration of all the IM
users and 𝑟 is the advertising rate the platform charges from
advertisers. For the sake of convenience, the advertising
demand function rearranges to inverse functional form as𝑟(𝑛𝑡, 𝑎). It has the following property: 𝜕𝑟/𝜕𝑛𝑡 > 0 and 𝜕𝑟/𝜕𝑎 <0. That means larger total online time duration raises the
advertising rate while advertisers’ demands less advertising
slot under higher advertising rate.
Additional registered users require IM platform to
increase the storage capacity to save users’ profile and chatting
log files. Such marginal cost is denoted by 𝑐𝐴. In the same
way, we denote the marginal bandwidth cost for additional
online user as 𝑐𝑡. Following the same specification as Gal-Or
and Dukes [15], the marginal cost of advertising is set to zero
since most of cost associated with production of advertising
message is borne by advertising agency. So the profit function
of IM platform can be formulated as follows
𝜋 = (𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) 𝑛 + (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑟 (𝑛𝑡, 𝑎) 𝑎. (1)
Define 𝜀𝑝𝐴 = −(𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝑝𝐴)(𝑝𝐴/𝑛) as elasticity of users
registering with respect to price, 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 = (𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝑎)(𝑎/𝑛) as
the elasticity of number of affiliated IM user with respect
to number of advertisers, 𝜀𝑝𝑡 = −(𝜕𝑡/𝜕𝑝𝑡)(𝑝𝑡/𝑡) as time
elasticity with respect to time rate, 𝜀𝑡|𝑛 = (𝜕𝑡/𝜕𝑛)(𝑛/𝑡) as
the time elasticity with respect to IM user number, 𝜀𝑟 =−(𝜕𝑎/𝜕𝑟)(𝑟/𝑎) as price elasticity of advertising demand, and𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 = (𝜕𝑟/𝜕𝑛𝑡)(𝑛𝑡/𝑟) as advertising demand elasticity with
respect to the total time duration. From the assumption
above, we can find that except for 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 > 0, 𝜀𝑡|𝑛 > 0 the
remaining elasticities are all negative. With these definitions,
the following result can be proved.
Proposition 1. If nonnegative price constraint and proper sec-
ond order sufficient condition holds, the optimal price structure
of monopolistic platform consists of four cases according to
different combination of parameter condition. The four cases
are listed in Table 1.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 states that if the marginal cost of platform
is not very high, IM users will enjoy free communication
service provided by IM operator. This conclusion contradicts
the common sense that consumers are often hurt by high
monopolistic price. Let us start from the first baseline case
in second row and second column of Table 1 which IM
platform charges positive prices to both sides of platform to
explain such contradiction.Note that in single-sided platform
without cross-group externalities, the optimal price structure
would be
𝑝𝐴 − [𝑐𝐴 − (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡]
𝑝𝐴 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝐴 ,
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡
𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝑡 ,
(2)
𝑟 − 0
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟 . (3)
Expressions (2) imply that platform employs razor-blade
business model [21]. The price of user registry is lower than
its marginal cost by the factor (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)(1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡. This factor
can be decomposed into two parts: the first part (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)𝑡 is
the profit generated by additional user from his online time
payments; the second part (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)𝜀𝑡|𝑛𝑡 is the profit from
users’ longer online time duration resulting from more users
keeping online. However, duration rate charge is inflated to
monopoly level to compensate the loss on lower registry
price. On the other side of the market, expression (3) also
indicates advertisers are levied monopolistic advertising rate
although it looks a little odd. That is because advertising rate
is assumed zero.
Comparing to single-sided platform, the price for two-
sided IM platform users is further adjusted downward by
a factor 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 ⋅ 𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡. This term represents external benefits
to platform which additional unit of users’ total online time
duration is attracted. To see this, note first that the platform
makes profit 𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡 from extra unit of users’ total online
time. Second 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 measures higher advertising rate that the
platform can extract from advertisers without losing any
advertisers.
On the other side of the platform, the advertising rate
is adjusted upward by a factor [(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 +(𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)(1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡]𝜀𝑛|𝑎(𝑛/𝑎). This factor shares the same
term (𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)(1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡 with users’
registry price.The reason for this common term is that raising
registry price and increasing the number of advertisers both
reduce the number of registered IM users. The term 𝜀𝑛|𝑎
measures the responsiveness of the number of affiliated IM
users to advertisers while 𝑛/𝑎 represents how many users
per advertiser can reach IM platform. Certeris paribus, if
advertiser can reach more users, IM platform can charge
higher advertising rate without losing advertisers. Such rate
is even higher than the single-sided monopoly market price
level. This is because IM users are assumed to dislike ads.
Therefore, IM platform increases the advertising rate to
prevent toomany ads fromdistracting IMusers. In summary,
the price structure of IM platform internalizes cross-group
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Table 1: The optimal price structure of monopolistic IM platform.
𝑐𝐴 ≥ (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡 𝑐𝐴 ≤ (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 +
𝑎𝑟
𝑛𝑡 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡
𝑐𝑡 ≥ 𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝐴 − [𝑐𝐴 − (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡]
𝑝𝐴 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝐴 , 𝑝𝐴 = 0,
𝑝𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝑡 ,
𝑝𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝑡 ,
𝑟 + [(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 (𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟
𝑟 + [(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡 − 𝑐𝐴] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 (𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟
𝑐𝑡 ≤ 𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑡 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝐴 − [𝑐𝐴 − ((𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡]
𝑝𝐴 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝐴 , 𝑝𝐴 = 0,
𝑝𝑡 = 0, 𝑝𝑡 = 0,
𝑟 + [(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + ((𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 (𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟
𝑟 + [((𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡 − 𝑐𝐴] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 (𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟
Note: The first row and first column of Table 1 list different combination of parameter region. The optimal price structure is summarized in cells located in the
second and third rows of Table 1.
externality between users and advertisers by subsidizing users
from advertising revenue.
The remaining three cases, inwhich one or all of the prices
are set to zero, are stemming from the aforementioned base-
line case. The difference between them is that the marginal
cost is so low that the nonnegative constraint is binding in
the three remaining cases. Proposition 1 can help to explain
why nearly all the IM client software is free to register but
some of them (Skype) need to pay some money to make calls
to mobile and landlines. That is because the marginal cost
for IM users is so low comparing to the advertising revenue,
which is generated by users’ total online time. Users’ registry
price is double subsidized both under razor-blade business
model and under two-sidedmarketmodel.The reason for the
positive charge of VoIP call by Skype is that Skype needs to
pay the access charge fee to telecommunication carrier. That
causes themarginal online cost to be substantially higher than
that of other IM without VoIP function. Thus, positive price
is applied to SkypeVoIP call though it is still lower than actual
marginal cost due to subsidies from advertising revenue.
3. Duopolistic Platforms
Referring to the model specification of horizontal differenti-
ated duopolist outlined byArmstrong [5] andArmstrong and
Wright [10], two IM platforms are located in the two ends of
linear market, respectively. Users were uniformly distributed
on this linear market, which indicates users have different
preference for two IM platforms.
Every user can only affiliate to one IM platform and
the two platforms are not compatible. User located in 𝑛1
derives utility of 𝑈1 = V0 + 𝛼𝑛1 − 𝑝𝐴1 − 𝜏𝑛1 − 𝜔𝑎1 when
he/she registered on platform 1. V0 is user’s intrinsic utility
when he/she affiliates to any platform. 𝛼 is the strength
of intragroup network externality or the incremental utility
generated by an additional user. 𝑛1 can also represent the
share of how many users affiliated with platform 1. 𝑝𝐴1 is
the registry fee charged by platform 1 to users. 𝜏 is user’s
virtual transport cost which also can represent the difference
between two platforms. In the same manner, the utility user
derived from registering on IM platform 2 is denoted by𝑈2 =
V0+𝛼𝑛2−𝑝𝐴2 −𝜏𝑛2−𝜔𝑎2 and 𝑛1+𝑛2 = 1. According toHotelling
model, the number of users who affiliate to each IMplatforms
is listed, respectively:
𝑛1 = 12 +
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1 + 𝜔 (𝑎2 − 𝑎1)2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) ,
𝑛2 = 12 +
𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑝𝐴2 + 𝜔 (𝑎1 − 𝑎2)2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) .
(4)
We make assumption 𝛼 − 𝜏 < 0 which means the
difference between two IM platforms is larger than the
intragroup network externality. Therefore, neither platform
can cover the whole market. Expression (4) indicates that
when the registry fee of platform 1 is lower and the advertisers
who connect to platform 1 are fewer, more users will register
on platform 1, and vice versa.
The online time duration of user on platform 1 is assumed
as 𝑡1(𝑛1, 𝑝𝑡1) = 𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑝𝑡1. 𝑛1 is the number of IM users who
affiliate with platform 1. 𝛽 > 0 indicates the more users
register on platform 1, the longer the representative user keeps
online. 𝑝𝑡1 is the duration rate charged by platform 1 on the
basis of time length. Users will spend less time if the duration
rate is higher. In the same manner the online time duration
of users on platform 2 is 𝑡2(𝑛2, 𝑝𝑡2) = 𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑝𝑡2.
If advertiser places ads on platform 𝑖, the total profit
he/she derives from users’ total online time duration is
denoted by 𝜃𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖. And advertiser needs to pay advertising rate𝑟𝑖 to platform 𝑖. So the net surplus which advertiser obtains
from placing ads on platform 𝑖 can be formulated as 𝜃𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖 −𝑟𝑖.
If advertisers choose single homing, they only need to pay
single advertising rate to single platform, but his/her ads can
only be viewed by single platform’s IM users. If advertisers
choose multihoming, their ads can reach all the IM users at
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expense of double advertising rate. Since two platforms are
homogeneous to advertisers, advertisers only care about net
surplus attributed to advertising on platforms. Advertisers
will choose the alternatives with highest net surplus from
multihoming, single homing on platform 1, single-homing
on platform 2, and no affiliation to any platform. When
advertisers choose multihoming, their net surplus must be
larger than the other alternatives. So we must have 𝜃(𝑛1𝑡1 +𝜃𝑛2𝑡2) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 ≥ 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 − 𝑟1, 𝜃(𝑛1𝑡1 + 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 ≥𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 − 𝑟2 and 𝜃(𝑛1𝑡1 + 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2) − 𝑟1 − 𝑟2 ≥ 0. Rearranging and
combining these expressions we get 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2.
Following the same manner, when advertisers choose single
homing on platform 1, we get 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2.
When advertisers choose single-homing onplatform2,we get𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2.When advertisers do not affiliate to any
platform, we get 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≤ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2. The homing choice
of advertisers divides advertiser’s parameter space into four
regions. Then we will discuss the optimal pricing decision
under four cases.
3.1. Advertiser Multihoming (𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≥ 𝑟2).
The number of advertisers is unitized to be one. The profit
function of platform 1 can be formulated as follows
𝜋1 = (𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴) 𝑛1 + (𝑝𝑡1 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑛1𝑡1 + 𝑟1
s.t. 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≥ 𝑟2.
(5)
The profit of platform 2 can be formulated in the same
manner.The following proposition presents the optimal price
structure of two platforms under symmetric equilibrium.
Because the equilibrium is symmetric, the subscript number
of price pair which indicates platform 1 or 2 is suppressed for
short.
Proposition 2. With nonnegative price constraint and proper
second order sufficient condition holding, the optimal price
structure of duopolistic platform under symmetric equilibrium
consists of four cases according to different combination of
parameter condition. The four cases are listed in Table 2.
Proof. See the appendix.
It still makes sense to compare the first baseline case
in which IM platform charges positive price with single-
sided platform case.When there is no cross-group externality
between IM users and advertisers, the optimal price structure
under Hotelling model is
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − ((1/2) 𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡) ((3/2) 𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡)4 ,
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡4 ,
𝑟 = 𝜃 (𝛽 − 2𝑐𝑡)8 .
(6)
It is obvious that the IM platform still employs the razor-
blade business model, which subsidizes registry fee with
online duration profit. Comparing expressions (6) to the
cell in the second row and second column of Table 2, the
prices for IMusers are adjusted downward by advertisers’ unit
profit from users’ total online time duration. The reasoning
is the same as in the monopolistic case. Besides that, all of
advertisers’ profit is extracted by two platforms to subsidize
users. They are in the same circumstance with monopolistic
case. That is because they choose multihoming, their bar-
gaining power does not change even when IM platforms are
competing with each other.
It is interesting to compare the equilibrium outcome
between monopolistic platform and duopolistic case with
advertisers multihoming. Unlike monopolistic case, the vir-
tual transport cost raises the registry fee while intra-group
externality reduces it. Since infinite virtual transport cost is
equivalent to monopolistic case, moderate virtual transport
cost in duopolistic case actually cuts the registry fee. Intra-
group externality among users is more likely to lead to highly
concentrated market.Thus, duopolistic platforms lower their
registry fee to avoid their customers being distracted to
each other. However, their registry fee offsets each other. In
duopolistic equilibrium, IM users are allocated equally to two
IM platforms due to symmetric registry fee.
Proposition 2 shows that in the symmetric equilibrium
the nonnegative constraint on the pricing of the platform
results in four different pricing configurations.The difference
of Propositions 1 and 2 is that the prerequisites for zero
price are determined by additional factors. These factors
include virtue transport cost 𝜏, intra-group externality 𝛼, and
responsiveness of user online time duration to the number
of affiliated users 𝛽. From the first row of Table 2, virtual
transport cost associated with marginal cost of users’ registry
narrows the likelihood of zero registry fee, while intra-group
externality together with double subsidy from razor-blade
and two-sidedmarket businessmakes IM usersmore likely to
enjoy free registry service. From the first column of Table 2,
responsiveness of user online time duration to the number
of affiliated users makes it less likely for IM platform charges
zero price for user’s online time duration, ceteris paribus.This
is because when users spend longer time online due to more
affiliated other users, they may derive higher utility from
online communication. Platform is privileged to demand
more user surplus by a higher time duration rate.
3.2. Advertisers Single-Homing on Platform 1 (𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≥ 𝑟1,𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2). Theprofit function of platform 1 is the same as in
the multihoming case. The profit function of platform 2 can
be formulated as follows:
𝜋2 = (𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴) 𝑛2 + (𝑝𝑡2 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑛2𝑡2
s.t. 𝑝𝐴2 ≥ 0, 𝑝𝑡2 ≥ 0.
(7)
The following proposition depicts the equilibrium of
single-homing.
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Table 2: The optimal price structure of duopolistic IM platforms when advertisers choose multi-homing.
𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 > 𝛼 + ((1/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 < 𝛼 +
((1/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)
4
𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 > 2𝜃
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − ((1/2) 𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) ((3/2) 𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4 , 𝑝𝐴 = 0,
𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 − 2𝜃4 , 𝑝𝑡 =
𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 − 2𝜃
4 ,
𝑟 = 𝜃 (𝛽 − 2𝑐𝑡 + 2𝜃)8 𝑟 =
𝜃 (𝛽 − 2𝑐𝑡 + 2𝜃)
8
𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 > 𝛼 + 𝛽 (𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 < 𝛼 + 𝛽 (𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡)
𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 < 2𝜃
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 (𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡), 𝑝𝐴 = 0,
𝑝𝑡 = 0, 𝑝𝑡 = 0,
𝑟 = 𝛽𝜃4 𝑟 =
𝛽𝜃
4
Note: the first and third rows and the first column of Table 1 list different combination of parameter region. The optimal price structure is summarized in the
cells located in the second and fourth rows of Table 2.
Proposition 3. Under proper second order sufficient condi-
tion, the optimal price for users of two platform is listed as
follows:
𝑝𝐴1 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − 23
(𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) (3𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4
− 13
(𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡) (3𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡)4 ,
𝑝𝑡1 = 𝛽𝑛1 + 𝑐
𝑡 − 𝜃
2 ,
𝑟1 = 𝜃 (𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐
𝑡 + 𝜃) 𝑛12 ,
(8)
𝑝𝐴2 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − 13
(𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) (3𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4
− 23
(𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡) (3𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡)4 ,
𝑝𝑡2 = 𝛽𝑛2 + 𝑐
𝑡
2 ,
𝑟2 = +∞.
(9)
The number of users affiliated with platform 1 is
𝑛1 = 12 +
4𝜔 − 𝜃 (2𝛽 + 𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡)
2 (3𝛽2 − 4𝛽𝑐𝑡 + 2𝛽𝜃 − 12𝜏 + 12𝛼) . (10)
Proof. See the appendix.
From expression (9), we can find that the pricing of plat-
form 2 follows the traditional principle of monopoly price.
Since there is no ad on platform 2, the subsidy for online time
duration rate from advertising profit is not feasible.Therefore,
the online duration rate is strictly positive. Nevertheless,
registry fee is subsidized by razor-blade business model,
which makes it is possible to below zero.
Expressions (8) and (9) also show the registry fee of
platforms 1 and 2 depends on virtual transport cost, the
intra-group externality, and profits derived from online time
duration. Registry fee decreases when the virtual transport
cost is smaller and the intra-group externality is larger. It is
noteworthy that although there is no ad in platform 2, the
profit parameter 𝜃 which advertiser derives from per unit of
online time duration enters into the registry fee of platform
2. That reflects the strategic effect of two platforms.
Expression (10) indicates the number of users who affil-
iated to platform 1 depends on the parameter regions. In
different parameter regions, the market share of platform can
be either above 1/2 or below it. It is the same for platform
2. The reason for such result is that advertisers are assumed
homogeneous. So as long as the advertising rate is lower than
the profit derived from advertising on IM platform, all the
advertisers will connect to the platform and vice versa. As
platform cannot control the number of affiliated advertisers
precisely, themarket share of users for two platforms is hardly
symmetric. Since the registry fee and duration rate all depend
on market share of users, the competitive equilibria are not
necessarily symmetric. Only if 4𝜔 = 𝜃(2𝛽 + 𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡), then the
market share of affiliated users belonging to two platforms
both equals to 1/2. In this circumstance, the duration rate
of platform 1 is lower than that of platform 2 because of
subsidy from advertising profit. In the meantime, single-
homing advertisers also make the registry fee of platform 1
lower than that of platform 2.
3.3. Advertisers Single-Homing on Platform 2 (𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≤𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≥ 𝑟2). This case is symmetric with previous
case. Therefore, the conclusion is also the same as that in
Proposition 3.
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3.4. Advertiser Nonaffiliation (𝜃𝑛1𝑡1 ≤ 𝑟1, 𝜃𝑛2𝑡2 ≤ 𝑟2). In
this case, two platforms charge a rather high advertising rate
in order to deter all the advertisers. Therefore, two platforms
degenerate into single-sided market. After simple derivation,
the prices charged to users under symmetric equilibrium are
given in expression (6).
After four cases are analyzed, the next step is to make
a comparison of these four cases. Denote the profit under
multihoming case and nonaffiliating as 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋𝑁. It is easy
to verify
𝜋𝑀 = 116 [8 (𝜏 − 𝛼) − 𝛽2 + 2𝛽𝑐𝑡 − 2𝛽𝜃] ,
𝜋𝑁 = 116 [8 (𝜏 − 𝛼) − 𝛽2 + 2𝛽𝑐𝑡] .
(11)
Obviously 𝜋𝑀 < 𝜋𝑁. Comparing to the symmetric
equilibrium under multihoming, platforms obtain more
profits by deterring all advertisers. This is resulting from
the subsidy structure of platform. No matter under multi-
homing or nonaffiliation, platforms will subsidize registry
fee by online time duration profit motivated by razor-blade
business model. Although the online time duration profit is
different undermultihoming case andnonaffiliation case, two
platforms engage in Hotelling style symmetric competition,
and two symmetric platforms obtain the same online time
duration profit under multihoming case. This result also
holds under no-affiliation case. Nevertheless, platform not
only subsidizes registry fee by online time duration profit but
also subsidizes it with extra profit resulting from the change of
user online time duration. Such part of extra profit is different
under multihoming and nonaffiliation. It is (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)𝛽𝑛𝑖
under multihoming and (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)𝛽𝑛𝑖 under nonaffiliation.
The reason for such difference is that under multihoming
case platform will subsidize online time duration rate by the
profit extracted from advertisers. However, this cannot hap-
pen under nonaffiliation case. Therefore, in the symmetric
equilibrium, multihoming platforms need to subsidize more
to users than nonaffiliation platforms, leading to less profit for
itself.
When advertisers choose single-homing on platform 1, it
is easy to derive the profit of platform 1 𝜋1 and platform 2 𝜋2,
respectively:
𝜋1 = −𝛽
2𝑛1 + 𝛽𝑐𝑡 − 𝛽𝜃 + 4𝜏 − 4𝛼2 𝑛21,
𝜋2 = −𝛽
2𝑛2 + 𝛽𝑐𝑡 + 4𝜏 − 4𝛼2 𝑛22.
(12)
It is obvious that the profit of two platforms depends on
their affiliated users. As mentioned earlier, the market share
of users depends on relevant parameter regions. The relative
size of profits belonging to two platforms also depends on
that parameter regions. No explicit conclusion can be drawn
except for one special case when 𝑛1 = 𝑛2. It can be proved that𝜋1 = 𝜋𝑀 and 𝜋2 = 𝜋𝑁. Therefore, IM platform would rather
charge infinite high advertising rate to deter all advertisers.
In complement to previous conclusions, the following
proposition can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. In the symmetric equilibrium of horizontal
differentiated duopolistic platform, if all the advertisers derive
the same profit from each unit of online time duration and two
platforms attract equal number of users, platforms will choose
a rather high advertising rate to deter all the advertisers.
4. Conclusion
The popularity of IM among Internet users all over the
world represents the rise of digital media. The reason for
the popularity of IM is that it provided a rather cheap
communication alternative to people scattered in different
corner of the earth. However, IM rarely deserves the subject
of economic literature, especially for its pricing decision.
Motivated by this gap, this paper investigates the optimal
price structure of IM platform. Being different from literature
on two-sided markets and advertising-supported media, this
paper redefine the output of IM platform by adding another
time dimension to two-sided market model. Besides that,
this paper assumes intra-group externality among IM users,
which better illustrates the behavioral pattern of IM users.
The general conclusion of this paper is that under
nonnegative price constraint, IM operator adopts a heav-
ily skewed price structure that favors IM users. In con-
crete terms, firstly under monopolistic case, the IM plat-
form double-subsidizes users’ price motivated by the razor-
blade and two-sided market business model. Advertisers
are charged above-monopolistic-level advertising rate. When
advertising revenue is large enough relatively to marginal
cost for serving IM users, IM user can enjoy free service
provided by IM operators. Secondly, under duopolistic case
when advertisers choose multihoming, the equilibrium is
almost the same as monopolistic case; besides that the
virtual transport cost and responsiveness of user online
time duration to the number of affiliated users could raise
users’ price.Thirdly, when advertisers choose single-homing,
the IM platform with no ads charges strict positive online
time duration rates, but strategy effect leads platform also
to subsidize registry fee with advertising revenue. Fourthly,
if two platforms attract equal number of users, platforms
would choose a rather high advertising rate to deter all the
advertisers.
Our conclusion helps to explain why IM operator charges
rather low even zero price for IM users. Especially we
clarify under which conditions IM users could enjoy free
communication service provided by IM. Although we take
IM as context of our research, our conclusion also sheds
some light on the pricing problem of social network sites
(SNS), whose users share similar behavioral pattern to that
of IM users. Our result is still consistent with the free policy
provided for users by SNS operators in reality.
Next, this study can extend to heterogeneous user case.
We assume user homogeneity in terms of online time dura-
tion. In fact, different usersmay spend different length of time
online.Moreover, someuserswho spend longer online period
have higher willing to pay for online virtual goods. Platform
may utilize such user heterogeneity to gain more revenue.
That is effective method for Tencent, which is the biggest IM
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operator inChina. Such kind of price discrimination deserves
our further research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The IM platform makes choice of 𝑝𝐴,𝑝𝑡, and 𝑟 to maximize the total profit with the nonnegative
pricing constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary
condition for profit maximization is listed as follows:
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝐴 = 𝑛+[𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴+(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡+𝑎
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑛𝑡)(𝑡+𝑛
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑛)]
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑝𝐴 ≤0,
𝑝𝐴 ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜋𝜕𝑝𝐴𝑝𝐴 = 0,
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑝𝑡 = 𝑛𝑡 + 𝑛(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑛𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑡 ≤ 0,
𝑝𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜋𝜕𝑝𝑡𝑝𝑡 = 0,
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑎 = [(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) + (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎
𝜕𝑟
𝜕𝑛𝑡)(𝑡 + 𝑛
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑛)]
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑎
+ 𝑟 + 𝑎𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑎 ≤ 0, 𝑟 ≥ 0,
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑎 𝑟 = 0.
(A.1)
According to complementary slackness, when 𝑝𝐴 > 0 and
𝑝𝑡 > 0, 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝐴, and 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝑡 in (A.1) are set to zero.
Rearranging these two expressions, we have
𝑝𝐴 − [𝑐𝐴 − (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡]
𝑝𝐴 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝐴 ,
𝑝𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝑡 .
(A.2)
𝑐𝑡 ≥ (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 and 𝑐𝐴 ≥ (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)(1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡 are
necessary for 𝑝𝐴 > 0, and 𝑝𝑡 > 0 together with (A.2). If (A.2)
holds, 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑟 = 0 can be rearranged to be
𝑟+[(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)+(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡+(𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎(𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟
= 1𝜀𝑟 .
(A.3)
Because 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 > 0, 𝜀𝑡|𝑛 > 0, 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 < 0 the second term in the
numerator in (A.3) is negative. So that 𝑟 > 0 and it never
equals zero. Expressions (A.2) and (A.3) constitute the cell in
second row and second column of Table 1.
When 𝑝𝐴 = 0 and 𝑝𝑡 > 0, 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝐴 needs to be negative
and 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝑡 in (A.1) is set to zero. Expression 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝑡 = 0
implies
𝑝𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡 − (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝜀𝑝𝑡 . (A.4)
Expression (A.4) requires 𝑐𝑡 ≥ (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 for 𝑝𝑡 > 0 to
hold. Inequation 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑝𝐴 > 0 together with 𝑝𝐴 = 0 requires
[𝑐𝐴 − (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝑎(𝜕𝑟/𝜕𝑛𝑡))(𝑡 + 𝑛(𝜕𝑡/𝜕𝑛))](𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝑝𝐴) > 𝑛.
Nevertheless, 𝑐𝐴 ≤ (𝑝𝑡−𝑐𝑡+(𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡)𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡)(1+𝜀𝑡|𝑛)𝑡 is sufficient
for this inequation to hold. If 𝑝𝐴 = 0 and expression (A.4)
holds, 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑟 = 0 is rearranged to be
𝑟 + [(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡 + (𝑎𝑟/𝑛𝑡) 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡) (1 + 𝜀𝑡|𝑛) 𝑡 − 𝑐𝐴] 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 (𝑛/𝑎)
𝑟 =
1
𝜀𝑟 .
(A.5)
Because 𝜀𝑟|𝑛𝑡 > 0, 𝜀𝑡|𝑛 > 0, 𝜀𝑛|𝑎 < 0 the second term in
the numerator in (A.5) is negative. So that 𝑟 > 0 and it
never equals zero. 𝑝𝐴 = 0, (A.4) and (A.5) constitute the
cell in second row and third column of Table 1. The proof
for the rest part of Proposition 1 follows the same reasoning
and can be omitted for convenience. Besides that, theHessian
matrix of the maximizing problem evaluated at the solution
given above should be seminegative definite to guarantee the
sufficient condition for maximal. Proof of Proposition 1 is
complete.
Proof of Proposition 2. Because all the advertisers place ads
on platform 1, the profit function of platform 1 is linear in
advertising rate. The optimal choice of platform is to set
the advertising rate at the highest level that can keep all
the advertisers choosing multihoming. Then 𝑟1 = 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1.
The target function of platform under nonnegative price
constraints is
𝜋1 = (𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴) 𝑛1 + (𝑝𝑡1 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑛1𝑡1 + 𝜃𝑛1𝑡1
s.t. 𝑝𝐴1 ≥ 0, 𝑝𝑡1 ≥ 0.
(A.6)
The Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary condition for profit
maximization is listed as follows:
𝜕𝜋1𝜕𝑝𝐴1 = [𝑝
𝐴
1 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝑝𝑡1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) (2𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑝𝑡1)] 𝜕𝑛1𝜕𝑝𝐴1
+ 𝑛1 ≤ 0, 𝑝𝐴1 ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜋1𝜕𝑝𝐴1 𝑝
𝐴
1 = 0,
𝜕𝜋1𝜕𝑝𝑡1 = 𝑛1 [𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑝
𝑡
1 − 𝑝𝑡1 + 𝑐𝑡 − 𝜃] ≤ 0,
𝑝𝑡1 ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜋1𝜕𝑝𝑡1 𝑝
𝑡
1 = 0.
(A.7)
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According to complementary slackness, when 𝑝𝐴1 > 0, and𝑝𝑡1 > 0, then (𝜕𝜋1/𝜕𝑝𝐴1 ) = 0, (𝜕𝜋1/𝜕𝑝𝑡1) = 0. Setting 𝜕𝜋1/𝜕𝑝𝐴1 ,
and 𝜕𝜋1/𝜕𝑝𝑡1 in (A.7) equal to zero, we get
[𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝑝𝑡1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) (𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑝𝑡1)] 𝜕𝑛1𝜕𝑝𝐴1
+ 𝑛1 [1 + (𝑝𝑡1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃) 𝛽 𝜕𝑛1𝜕𝑝𝐴1 ] = 0,
(A.8)
𝑝𝑡1 = 𝛽𝑛1 + 𝑐
𝑡 − 𝜃
2 . (A.9)
Substitute (A.9) into (A.8) we have
𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐
𝑡 + 𝜃) (3𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4 = 2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) 𝑛1.
(A.10)
In the same manner we also have
𝑝𝑡2 = 𝛽𝑛2 + 𝑐
𝑡 − 𝜃
2 , (A.11)
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐
𝑡 + 𝜃) (3𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)4 = 2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) 𝑛2.
(A.12)
Taking (A.10) minus (A.12) we get
𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑝𝐴2
+ (𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡+𝜃)(3𝛽𝑛1 − 𝑐𝑡+𝜃)−(𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡+𝜃)(3𝛽𝑛2−𝑐𝑡+𝜃)4
= 2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) (𝑛1 − 𝑛2) .
(A.13)
Because in multihoming case the two platforms have equal
number of advertisers (𝑎1 = 𝑎2), the difference of IM users
between two platforms reduces to 𝑛1−𝑛2 = (𝑝𝐴2 −𝑝𝐴1 )/(𝜏−𝛼).
Expression (A.13) at last can be reformulated as
3𝛽2𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1𝜏 − 𝛼 − 4𝑐𝑡𝛽
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1𝜏 − 𝛼 +4𝜃𝛽
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1𝜏 − 𝛼 =12 (𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1 ) .
(A.14)
Expression (A.14) always holds only if 𝑝𝐴1 = 𝑝𝐴2 . So we
get 𝑛1 = 𝑛2 = 1/2 and 𝑝𝑡1 = 𝑝𝑡2 = 𝑝𝑡. Substitute these
results into (A.9), (A.10), (A.11), and (A.12). We have the
cell in second row and second column of Table 2. Condition𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 > 𝛼 + (((1/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)/4) and
𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 > 2𝜃 is necessary for 𝑝𝐴1 > 0, and 𝑝𝑡1 > 0 together
with 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − (((1/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)/4)
and 𝑝𝑡 = (𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 − 2𝜃)/4. 𝑟 can be derived accordingly.
If 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 < 𝛼 + (((1/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)/4)
and 𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 > 2𝜃, then 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − (((1/2)𝛽 −𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)((3/2)𝛽 − 𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃)/4) < 0. The nonnegative constraint
of 𝑝𝐴 is binding. Therefore, we have the cell in second row
and third column of Table 2. If 𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 < 2𝜃, then 𝑝𝑡 =
(𝛽 + 2𝑐𝑡 − 2𝜃)/4 < 0, and the nonnegative constraint of 𝑝𝑡 is
binding. So 𝑝𝑡 is set to zero in this circumstance. Taking this
condition as given, the symmetric solution of 𝑝𝐴1 , 𝑝𝐴2 satisfies𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 − 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡). When 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 > 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡),
𝑝𝐴 > 0 is consistent with nonnegative constraint. Then we
have the cell in fourth row and second column of Table 2.
When 𝑐𝐴 + 𝜏 < 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝜃 − 𝑐𝑡), 𝑝𝐴 < 0 is inconsistent with
nonnegative constraint. That constraint must be binding so
we have the cell in fourth row and third column of Table 2.
Besides that, the Hessian matrix of the maximizing problem
evaluated at the solution given above should be seminegative
definite to guarantee the sufficient condition for maximal.
Proof of Proposition 2 is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3. The decision of platform 1 is the same
as the previous case that all advertisers choose multihoming.
The first order condition is the same as multihoming case for
platform 1. Platform 2 chooses a rather high advertising rate
to deter all the advertisers. Since there are no ads on platform
2, its target function can be formulated as
𝜋2 = (𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴) 𝑛2 + (𝑝𝑡2 − 𝑐𝑡) 𝑛2𝑡2. (A.15)
According to the first order condition for maximization we
have
𝜕𝜋2𝜕𝑝𝐴2 = [𝑝
𝐴
2 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝑝𝑡2 − 𝑐𝑡) (2𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑝𝑡2)] 𝜕𝑛2𝜕𝑝𝐴2 + 𝑛2 = 0,
𝑝𝑡2 = 𝛽𝑛2 + 𝑐
𝑡
2 .
(A.16)
From (A.16) we get
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑐𝐴 + (𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐
𝑡) (3𝛽𝑛2 − 𝑐𝑡)4 = 2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) 𝑛2. (A.17)
When all the advertisers choose single-homing on platform
1, the number of affiliated users on platform 1 and platform 2
is listed, respectively:
𝑛1 = 12 +
𝑝𝐴2 − 𝑝𝐴1 − 𝜔2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) ,
𝑛2 = 12 +
𝑝𝐴1 − 𝑝𝐴2 + 𝜔2 (𝜏 − 𝛼) .
(A.18)
Substituting 𝑛1, 𝑛2 from (A.18) into (A.10) and (A.17) and
then solving the simultaneous equations, we can get first
expression in (8) and (9).The first expression in (8)minus the
first expression in (9) together with (A.18) implies expression
(10). Besides that, the Hessian matrix of the maximizing
problem evaluated at the solution given above should be
seminegative definite to guarantee the sufficient condition for
maximal. Proof of Proposition 3 is complete.
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